Convention contribution EN

From Noeuconstitution

Contents 1 Attac Vlaandern 2 Attac Denmark 3 Attac Spain 3.1 1. The citizen position in relation to the referendum and the European construction 3.2 2. The position of Attac Spain 3.3 3. Present situation and update of the ABC Plan. 3.4 4. Concrete proposals to include in Plan A 3.5 5. Concrete proposals to include in Plan B 3.6 6. Strategies of performance to remove ahead our proposals 3.7 7. The difficulty to get at agreements between the different ATTAC and their application 4 ATTAC Finland 5 Attac Germany 5.1 Standards for an alternative constitution 5.2 Minimal demands 5.3 Further reaching demands 5.3.1 Democratic participation 5.3.2 The principle of the state of law in the Union 5.3.3 Social, economic, and environmental policy of the union 5.4 Notes for discussion 6 Resolution from the Nordic ATTAC

Attac Vlaandern

How to prepare the future of the European Union

A plan for changing the constitutional treaty

The French and the Dutch 'no' have given rise to a crisis in the European Union. However, the real reason for this crisis is not the rejection of the constitutional treaty, but the difficult negotiations on the budget, on agricultural policies and on the enlargement. It is a political crisis that needs to be solved before the social and economic problems can be tackled.

Nevertheless, the left 'no' voters have a responsibility. They rejected a treaty but have to play a role in thinking of alternatives to it. The right is ready to attack the Euro, to further block social policies and to renationalize large parts of European policies. This nationalism of the right, an objective ally of neoliberalism, has to be stopped. The European Union has an enormous potential for playing a positive role for its people and for the people in the third world. We want to free this potential. No European country is able to stop the neoliberal globalisation on its own.

The left 'no' vote was not a vote against the European Union. It was a vote against neoliberal policies that impose competition between member-states and between workers. In so doing, they make any idea of political integration impossible. This is what we want to change. We accept to share national sovereignty but we do not want to diminish people's sovereignty.

We have the impression that much of the criticism on the European Union in fact concerns capitalism. Though this is understandable, we have to realize that Europe, as in mythology, has different fathers. We believe the shortest way to another Europe is the existing Europe. We have to democratize the European institutions that will allow us to fight for other policies and to find allies that can make a majority. We have to stop looking backwards and prepare the future of the European Union, looking for ways to mobilize, campaign and convince.

This is the background against which we want to make some proposals.

The ABC plan of the European Attacs is an enormous achievement. Its main advantage is the fact that it makes a difference between institutions and policies and between the short and the long term. This is indeed a condition to combine pragmatic proposals with more idealistic plans. It is an excellent way for progressively preparing the future.

We already made some comments on the ABC plan (http://vl.attac.be/article583.html). The following proposals are more concrete. But as in the ABC plan we make a difference between policies and institutions, and between the short, the medium and the long term. We especially think it is necessary

• to solve the political crisis as soon as possible
• to find allies that can help us to find a majority
• to leave open all possibilities to prepare 'our' ideal Europe. This means that we will have to accept compromises in the short term in order to have a chance to prepare a better future in the long term.
• To realize that the EU is a hybrid construction, not a traditional international organisation, nor a classical national state. It will never completely identify with either. Consequently, we do not have to try to make it look exactly like one of them. The EU is a construction sui generis.

Taking into account all these points, we think it is necessary to slightly modify the ABC-proposals: not ABC but BAC. B will be the short term and is aimed at immediately changing the constitutional treaty. We want to create a democratic space within which we can defend alternative policies. Without this democratisation we are powerless since there are no majorities to realize our proposals.

A will be the medium term for shaping our alternative policies. In doing so, we must not forget what the EU can do and what it cannot do. Asking things that are not European competences makes us loose credibility.

C will be the long term and will allow us to think of our ideal Europe, to plan it and to realize it.

The following proposals refer only to B and are for the short term. They imply some compromises in order to solve the political crisis. They want to delete the most negative points from the treaty. They want do create a democratic space in order to allow our fighting for alternative policies. This seems to us to be a condition sine qua non for looking at the future. It does not preclude anything for the future but leaves the door open for all alternative proposals.

1. Part III of the treaty has to be taken apart. It should become a separate treaty that can be changed with a qualified majority as defined in art. I-25,1. Policies can not be part of a constitutional treaty that has to be democratically neutral. This does not mean that part III does not have to be changed, on the contrary. But this can only happen when we find a majority to do it. Part III contains texts that are now in the existing treaties and that at any rate are binding.

2. Part II does not have to be changed, in spite of all its problems and shortcomings. It does not give the EU new competences and it cannot change national policies. National legislation and international commitments remain unchanged. Those who defended the constitutional treaty think that this Charter will allow them to make social progress. This is an opportunity for them to show it.

3. Part I: of course we want other values and objectives. Nevertheless, we only propose some small changes in order to facilitate an agreement. The proposed changes concern:

• deletion of the internal market and free competition in the objectives of the treaty
• right of initiative for the EP
• election of the European Commission by the European Parliament
• to end the confidentiality of the deliberations of the council
• to involve the EP in foreign affairs and defence matters
• to delete the conformity between defence policies and NATO
• to simplify the enhanced cooperation
• to allow for a budget deficit

a) art. I-3,2 : delete : 'and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted'.

b) Art. I-3,3 first para: 'based on balanced economic growth' has to be replaced by 'based on an ecologically responsible growth' . fourth line add: 'with a high level of social protection'

c) Art. I-3,3 third para: replace by 'The Union promotes economic and territorial cohesion, social convergence and the solidarity between member States'.

d) Art. I-20,1 : add: 'It can make legislative proposals to the European Commission and the Council '.

e) Art. I-24, 5 : add: 'the preparatory legislative deliberations are public'

f) Art. I-26, 2 : change the first sentence: 'The Commission can, like the European Parliament, propose legislative acts'.

g) Art. I-26,8 : complete the second sentence: 'The European Parliament may vote on a censure motion on the Commission or a member of the Commission' and change the third sentence: 'If such a motion is carried, the member or the members of the Commission, including the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, shall resign'.

h) Art. I-27, 1 : change: 'Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations with the European Council, the European Parliament elects with a majority of its members the President and the members of the Commission. This Commission shall be confirmed by the European Council with a qualified majority'.

i) Art. I-27,2 : delete.

j) Art. I-30, 2: change second sentence: 'The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability, to promote full employment and an ecologically responsible growth'.

k) Art. I-30,3: change second sentence : 'It shall be independent and is accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council and takes into account their advice' . Last sentence: delete.

l) Art. I-34, 1 : change first sentence: '.on the basis of proposals from the Commission or from the European Parliament ...' ; in art. I-34,3, delete: 'or of the European Parliament'.

m) Art. I-40,8: change: 'The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on all aspects and choices of the common foreign and security policy. Its advice can only be ignored in a motivated decision'.

n) Art. I-41,2 : last para: delete beginning with '.under the North Atalantic Treaty .'.

o) Art. I-41,3 : delete second para.

p) Art. I-41,7 : delete second para.

q) Art. I-41,8 : change: 'The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on all aspects and choices of the common security and defence policy. Its advice can only be ignored in a motivated decision'.

r) Art. I-44, 2 : 'at least on third of the Member-States' has to be replaced by 'at least one fifth of the Member-States'.

s) Art. I-52 : delete (is covered by art. I-47, 2).

t) Art. I-53, 2 : replace: 'The budget deficit shall not exceed 3 %'

u) Art. I-54, 2 : delete 'wholly'.

v) Art. I-55, 1 : delete 'within the limits of its own resources'.

w) Art. I-55, 3 : change second sentence: 'The Council decides with a qualified majority'.

4. In Part IV, art. IV-443 has to be changed in such a way that the Convention has to be elected and that the intergovernmental conference has to confirm the results of the Convention.

5. The protocols on the role of national parliaments and on subsidiarity have to be maintained.

We think that this procedure is the only way to take into account the left and the right 'no' votes. These changes democratize the treaty and make it possible for all to defend their ideas and to try to find majorities.

In part I all references to part III have to be changed. Please take into account that these proposals were written by non-legal persons and may need legal improvements.

Eric Goeman, speaker of Attac Vlaanderen, Francine Mestrum, Stijn Oosterlynck, Patrick Cohen, Francis Jorissen, Jenny Walry (scientific council Attac Vlaanderen)

Attac Denmark

1. Support for Plan ABC

ATTAC-Denmark is looking forward to work with the rest of ATTAC-Europe on the Plan ABC. We believe that such a process can be of use to us in the Danish debate on the EU and on the Constitution. We need alternatives to work with if we are to exploit the possibilities arising from the French and the Dutch no’s. If we dont start an offensive, there’s a danger that the victories of this year will be forgotten, giving the governments a second chance with the same Constitution.

2. It will not be easy

We should acknowledge at this stage that developing an alternative is not an easy process. Many contradictions could block the way –internally in the national ATTAC-organisations as well as between ATTAC-organisations. If anyone pushes too hard ahead, it could easily tilt the process. On the other hand if we are too scared to confront disagreements, and no attempt is made to solve them, we will get nowhere.

3. The Difficult Matter: The Institutions

We believe that the most difficult issue will be the debate on the EU-institutions. And given that according to the Plan ABC this is one of the first problems we are to solve among us, the phase B will give us a pretty good impression of the hard points. If we encounter unsurmountable contradictions we should solve them either by adjusting Plan ABC or by letting some of the ATTAC-Europe organisations go forward and develop a pattern of flexible cooperation.

4. The Nordics

We think that the place where this debate is most difficult is in the Nordic Countries. Except maybe for Norway, its been regarded as a virtue in the Nordic organisations to avoid going too deeply into the fundamental questions on the EU Treaties. Thus it was quite a step for ATTAC-Denmark to decide to campaign against the Constitution. But it was a decision that we have not regretted for a second.

In an upcoming meeting of the Nordic ATTAC-organisations, we hope to have a thorough debate on Plan ABC with the Swedes, Norwegians and Finns. Nordic Cooperation on these issues would be a big help for us.

Those were the main conclusions of our meeting.

Maybe it would be helpful to spell out some of it, to illustrate where some of the pitfalls may be, and how we may be able to beat them.

• Ex. 1: Legislative powers

Plan B leads us to discuss the institutions in a new treaty, and some points would be uncontroversial such as withdrawal from the Commission of its monopoly on legislative initiatives.

We’ve noticed that in the French debate its been widely denounced that the European Parliament does not possess this power. Are we on our way to give the European Parliament legislative power?

If we did, it would not necessarily be well received in Denmark. The idea that an institution by most considered a pretty distant, huge and where politicians are exposed to very little of the pressure for accountability that you find in national parliaments, would probably be rejected by many.

However, if we were to imagine some kind of enhanced cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament on legislation which both parties would have to approve, it would be different.

• Ex. 2. Competence

Are we proposing a federal/federalist solution?

There is a danger that when the debate starts out with the debate on the perfect European institutions without considering the question of competences (ie. issues) –and that is what is proposed in plan B- that we develop ideas about perfect institutions which would clash with other political parameters once it’s tested to reality.

Take for instance the public sector and the systematic attempt by the Commission, the ECJ and a majority of member states to use the market rules of the Treaty to liberalise one sector after the other. The offensive answer would be to demand common and high standards for public sectors financed and ruled in a spirit of solidarity. That is being tried out by some political actors.

The defensive answer would be to strengthen and impose the competence that member states enjoy over the public sector.

Somehow the latter answer is less appealing than the former. But the former is science-fiction.

I think this problem can be solved as well. But not easily. And the point here is really that the issue of the institutions cannot be solved without including both the political issues and the question of competence in the debate. So that’s a hint for the debate we will have under plan B.

• Ex.3. Minimum wage

Quite often we hear the demand for a minimum wage at EU-level. To many people, the proposal is a natural part of the struggle for a social Europe, and to practically of them, the Nordic resistance to it, is completely incomprehensible. Particularly since the trade unions up here would reject the idea en bloc.

Why is that?

Because in Scandinavia issues like wages is being resolved not by legislation but as a result of negotiations between employers and trade unions. Trade unions would never relinquish the power and the social rights included in this tradition, and one way to preserve it is to reject intervention in negotiations on wages by the state –be it the nation state or the EU.

In these parts about 85% of workers are organised. That number is much higher than most European countries, excluding Sweden and Norway where its pretty much the same.

However, it must be possible to develop an inclusive proposal.

Minimum wage could be a solution to the wage dumping that is underway in Europe, and just as we would firmly reject any proposal that could undermine the power of trade unions in our own country, it would be terrible if that position would block a strategy for a minimum wage that could be necessary in other parts of Europe.

This was just a few reflections. Just to point out some dangers and flag the hope for solutions.

ATTAC-Denmark

Attac Spain

THE POSITION OF ATTAC- SPAIN

Document to be presented in the meeting of European Attacs . Liege 23 october 2005

1. The citizen position in relation to the referendum and the European construction

Let us begin saying that in Spain the interest on the European subjects at citizen level is limited. People, both right and left, feel, "pro- europeian" and support the initiatives of the governments to participate in the process of European construction, but generally not much people are really interested by following the problems that affect this process. There is a kind of blind confidence or delegated confidence in which is necessary to be in Europe and in granting a "open check " to the changes that are taken place in the process of integration and extension of the European space.

This laziness of citizen power , does that the issues of Brussels and the European institutions appear as too distant and they are perceived like a more or less bureaucratic machine where legislative dispositions start up that later favor or harm the development of the economic activity at national, regional or sectoral level . There is a larger preoccupation by the inner problems related to the decentralization of competitions, the distribution of regional power within the State of the autonomies and the problems related to the sub-Sahara emigration, that has in Spain the main front door.

The decisions of neo-liberal policies apply by the European Commission, have caused often s strikes and popular rejection. Above all , why they have meant the partly destruction of the industrial tissue or the reduction of the agricultural production. Particularly sensible had been the restructuring processes of iron and steel and naval sectors, the privatization and segregation of main enterprises on public sector, the reduction of the cattle stock and the delivery of the milky sector to European multinationals. But, at the same time, have been well received the structural and cohesion funds that has helped to modernize the transport infrastructure system.

As referring the attitude of the last governments, a kind of pendular swing is perceived at citizen level : socialist governments have declared, by principle, clearly pro-European whereas the popular right has adopted positions more “euroskeptics” or clearly pro-Americans mainly in the Aznar stage. For that reason a good part of the results in favor of YES on the Treaty referendum must related with that will from "return to Europe" that served from slogan to the Zapatero government topushthe referendum.

These are some of the keys to understand the YES in the Spanish referendum. In Spain and Luxembourg they have prevailed YES , but while in Luxembourg the level of electoral participation has been high (88 %), in Spain a level of participation has occurred specially low (44%), the minor from the return to the democracy in 1977. The results of the referendum have been object of varied interpretations, from which they see in them a “veiled negative vote” to the constitutional Treaty; the lack of interest by the proposal or the lack of information and institutional manipulation on the part of the government to avoid any type of debate on the constitutional text. In any case the interpretations are complex in a country like Spain, that has one of the higher levels of decentralization of Europe and where the autonomic governments have transferred numerous competitions, from the health to education or the local infrastructure management. It also happens to now speaking of the adhesion levels citizen rejection with respect to the project of European construction, that must be often interpreted often in key of strategies designed by the different parties.

2. The position of Attac Spain

For ATTAC Spain the rejection to the Treaty reached in France and Holland were seen like a hopefull door in the common objective to bridle the unstoppable march of the neo-liberal globalización in Europe. The referendum campaign has allow an important debate around all Europe, that served to verify the popular reject to the neo-liberalism and to the model of European construction in course This rejection has served to express the social malaise of significant countries by means of popular strikes and protests. In many European countries the application of the European liberal policies is related directly to under growth, unemployment, the stagnation of the wages and the cut of the welfare state . For that reason the declaration made by European Attacs on June and the start up Convention for the democratic re-founding of Europe, as well as the specific ABC Plan, were valued with interest from the beginning in Attac Spain, that was represented in that Convention.

This adhesion of Attac Spain is formulated in one double direction:

• the search of alliances with other groups or political forces that support the process of Convention of the ATTAC,
• the opening of channels to the citizenship which they take step to forms of participativa democracy, one of the bases of our political project.

3. Present situation and update of the ABC Plan.

The ABC Plan elaborated in June established some strategic priorities of performance to short, half and long term like way to stop the ne-oliberal policies in the horizon of a democratic re-foundation of Europe. In the short term or “ Plan A “ several "shock proposals “ are appointed to paralyze immediately "the hotter" measures adopted by the European institutions oriented to reinforce the neo-liberal policy of the last years.

Nevertheless, in the outlook of Attac Spain is necessary to reframe some aspects and up- to- date the proposals in the sense of answer these questions:

• What is the present situation and the immediate objectives
• Are all he objectives of the ABC Plan in use ?
• what we hoped to obtain in the different stages from the Plan?
• how to agree on these objectives ?

One of the data that condition the present situation is the confirmation of shutdown of the process of approval of the Treaty, that represented the main focus of attention to formulate the proposals of the ABC Plan.

The crisis in this process of approval has opened a period of reflection, explanation and debate that can extend until 2007 or even until 2009.

Proposal: For these reasons, we propose that the debate on a new Constitution be remove from our "short be term" AGENDA until the situation be clarified.

Since the process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty has not been completed, we understand that the effective Treaty is the one of Nize Treaty and on this treaty we will have to articulate our proposals of democratization of the European institutions.

As far as the objectives initially contemplated in the ABC Plan, the position of Attac- Spain it is that one narrow relation between the Plans A and B exists: the rejection rupture with the neo- liberal policies cannot become if it is not deepened in the democratization of the European institutions.

Consequently we propose to jointly focus the short term work of the ATTACs as much in the Plan A and in the Plan B, and to present concrete proposals on these lines in the meeting of the 15 of December.

4. Concrete proposals to include in Plan A

The proposals contained initially in Plan A (Actions and mobilizations against the European liberal policies), must to ours understand a limited statement in the measurement of which they seem to elude all reference to the dominant system of neo-liberal globalización in which Europe moves. In some aspects we think all the short term aspirations of the European ATTAC do not are taken in account.

We stated that most of the proposals (1, 2.3, 4, 5 and 8) is centered in the European scope. Hardly reference to the world-wide scope and the solidary paper that would have to play Europe in that horizo.

a) Proposals of European scope. Priorities of performance

As for the proposals of European scope it would be necessary to put itself in agreement on the priorities to establish in our actions and short term mobilizations (European Summit of the 15 of December) as well as in the great lines on which a minimum consensus or agreements on the part of different the ATTACs must settle down European. On the part of Attac-Spain the priorities of the Plan To would have to settle down in the following order:

1. To retract all the projects of European Directives for liberalisation in progress and on which the UE continues legislating, in spite of the citizen rejection

• Bolkestein directive (its parliamentary proceeding is parked momentarily). It is necessary to press so that its implementation does not progress.
• Directives on the time and the conditions of work. On the quality of the new employs proposed in the Strategy of Lisbon. On the infant work.
• Other dispositions contained in the Strategy of Lisbon (retiring regimes, e.g) that have relation with the European social model.
• The update modification of the convergence criteria ( Maastricht) and the alternatives to the Pact of stability

In the European Council of Lisbon (March of 2000), the UE decided to develop common policies for employment, publishing diverse directives. Although a "high level of employment " is defended the adopted directions are far to contemplate a quality employment ", favoring on the contrary the development of flexible, precarious and bad remunerated employs, as the only alternative to unemployment.

2. The relaunching of the European economy

This proposal of "relaunching" - or new economic push of Europe - must contemplate a ampler macroeconomic scenario and not be limited to a few recommendations of public investments, monetary policy or credit policy.

Of course, if one is to reinforce social Europe, one of the basic objectives is the creation of employs . But also it is necessary to consider the proposal of : more efficient macroeconomic policies on European scale; structural policies more balanced and the way to face the competition/collaboration with other spaces. These scenes must, as well, contemplate the more suitable fiscal policies to obtain the proposed objectives and, mainly, approach the subject of the fiscal competition /harmonization of the countries of the Union. This subject constitutes, next to the social harmonization and the existence of important regional /national imbalances in the generation and distribution of wealth one of the weak points of the European construction.

This macroeconomic analysis must be evaluated in relationship of the neo-liberal policies applied by the European institutions, proposing viable alternative to the theoretical freedom that supports the movement of the factors production ( movements of capitals particularly), the control of changes and the financial markets.

This analysis must be accompanied with putting into place effective policies and measures to eradicate offshore centers and fiscal paradises in European space ( and abroad) and to promote global taxes as instrument for attempt social objectives .

The extension of the UE of 15 to 25 members is supposing the reinforcing of the neo-liberal model of a the UE; the imposition of an integration policy that can cause important inter-territorial imbalances ; hardening the competition between the countries of the Union. In this sense we want to emphasize the necessity that ATTAC of Europe give an consensual answer to the phenomenon of the de-localization that faces the different countries from the UE.

3. The European Social Model (ESM)

This issue must be one of the short term priorities within the Plan A. Is necessary to modify the European social Chart and to reach minimum agreements on the European Social Model within the ATTACs. As work document we supported the presented by Attac-France “Quel modèle social européen” that can be a reference document on which to continue working.

In any case we consider urgent to decide an consensual answer to the "Blair alternative" of “modernization” of the ESM (in order to propose a smaller protection to unemployment; the adjustment of the system of pensions, the privatization of the social services , the de-regulation of the work market, the change in the enterprise policy of subventions for the promotion of employ, and a great impulse for the creation of a "true single market".

We know the effects of this type of “modernization” and we do´nt wish for us.

4. The re-dimension of the European Budget and its distribution

We defend the increase or in the most unfavorable case the maintenance of the European Budget, that would not have to be inferior to the 1, 3 -1,5 % of the GDP of the Union. A reduction of the European Budget from 1.27% to the 1.0 or 1.1 % of the Union GDP , as Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Holland and Sweden defend would prevent to put in practice no policy that goes beyond the regulation of the economic and monetary Union.

With that budget it is impossible to finance the policy of referred cohesion the States of the East, where some territory does not reach 17% of the European average revenue and it is not possible a reasonably maintain of the structural funds applied these years in the Union of 15 States. The criteria of distribution and the control of this budget must be put under the most direct forms of citizen participation and not only the derived ones from the bureaucracy of the Commission. The European Parliament in co-legislation with the national level must define the main entries of budgetary destiny, as well as the priorities of application.

• We propose the creation of a “Committee observatory “ composed by members of ATTACs that analyzes and evaluates the communitarian budgets and the budgetary entries , with the objective to inform to the european citizens into the true application of these the budgets. This Committee observatory would be the embryo of possible initiatives that allow to the citizen mobilization and the beginning of a process of citizen control

• Proposal of effective measures that allow to built a “solidary Europe” in its different means: social; territorial/ regional; inter-communitarian; aid to sectors involved in international crisis e.g. In the inner scope these instruments of solidarity must be oriented to the cohesion and the economic and social re-balance of the different spaces from the Union

The monetary discourse that establish the dichotomy between ” net contributor countries “ and “beneficiary countries” must be surpassed ; the new incorporated countries have serious social deficit and regional imbalance. In this sense we understand that the speech of the ATTACs to be directed to the citizens would have to be very different from the one from the governments and to whom appears in the constitutional Treaty. This position would have to be reflected of one more a more precise and clear manner in the project of measures or claims contained in the Plan A and not like a good expression of intentions within Plan C, by another possible Europe.

b) Proposals insufficiently boarded

If we do not want to think about "short circuit", we must recover the “altermundista” speech of the ATTAC, because it is not possible "Another Europa" if we did not trust making possible "AnotherWorld".

We agree in which there is necessary to go from the concrete to the general, but understand that both spaces clearly are interrelated.

Europe has a "very next world-wide space" (the Mediterranean space) in which occur the circumstances of hunger, misery and underdevelopment, but that UE imposes to that space the rules of the unequal interchange, the policies of adjustment, the privatization of the Essential Public Services, etc. And that does using the institutional frame of the “ Euromediterranean Partenariat”. For that reason, in addition to the exposed proposals in Plan A (Retract of all the projects of European directives of liberalization that are in course etc ) we propose to include:

5. The reframing in the agreements of the UE with the OMC (and GATS arranges)

• not only in the European internal space, but considering the relations with third countries and particularly with the next one of Mediterranean South . Abandonment of the rules of unequal interchange with these countries, in as much that dominant economic power, together with United States. We must assume that the democratic refoundation of Europe also means the refoundation of the relations of Europe with the rest of the world-wide spaces, as much of the first world (the USA, Japan,..), like, mainly, of the Third world.

• Denounce of the policies that the European Union impels like imperialistic power and as beneficiary subject of the export policies of the OMC, the IMF, etc., to the countries of the South and of the Mediterranean South . Modification of the effective legislation that affects to the relations with these countries.

• Greater commitment of the Attacs of Europe with World Social Forums like instruments of visualization and mobilization of the “altermundialismo” (at world-wide level) .To assume an active commitment in the impulse of the anotherworld movement in the Mediterranean space supporting the Mediterranean Social Forum (FSMed) in this space next to Europe

6. Changing the migratory policies of the UE and the european countries.

The UE must take a clear position UE in relation to the phenomenon from the emigration and especially with immigration coming from the African Continent, the most impoverished of the planet. Besides to impel the measures destined to avoid that the human rights of the emigrants are violated, the UE must assume his historical and present responsibility in the despoil of the African continent on the part of the European TNC that act with the support more or less concealed of the governments. It is necessary establish terms of true collaboration with the emitting countries applying to criteria of solidarity in the solutions and forms of worthy welcome in the receiving countries.

7. Solidarity with the countries of the South : Proposal of cancellation of the debt on the part of the countries of the UE. Denouncement of plans of structural adjustment in these countries and the European companies or governments who participate in them.

8. A different approach from the public Aid to the development.

The philosophy contained in the Plan A is not very far to that raises the United Nations or the IMF and the World Bank. In the last Assembly of we have been able to state the contradictions to that it takes the program of "Objectives of the Millenium", as well as the frustrations of the world-wide platforms that move in the fight against the hunger and the poverty. Not even you lead them European and world-wide that was had more it jeopardize with this subject have been able to defend its previous positions. It is precise to emphasize the importance of a genuine proposal of Attac as it is of the global taxes, as form of financing of the development.

5. Concrete proposals to include in Plan B

• Institutional Reforms

Indoor the architecture of the european institutions it is necessary to introduce the rules of the "State of Right", which accept a system of division of powers. That allows the control of the exercise of power and its possible abuses . Also endow with greater legitimacy the decisions taken by institutions that emanate of the popular will through the suffrage,.

In this sense European Union (UE), like political structure, undergoes of a double democratic deficit . As hybrid structure between the State- Nation and an association of States, the legislative power has been derived towards "not-democratic" spaces and in counterpart he is producing more of 60 % of the laws applicable to the European citizens.

On one hand, the organisms that have the legislative power, the European Commission and the Council (of Ministers) has not been elected by universal suffrage . By another one the legislation of European Right it is over the national jurisdictions and empty the function of national parliaments that are displaced to a simple roll of adaptation of the European norms.

The European Parliament, chosen by suffrage, “co-legislates” with its capacity of veto but it lacks initiative in legislate. On the other hand , the European Council and the lobbies neighbouring the Commission press,” sotto voce”, with a successful and determining action. The national Parliaments do not have any active control, with the exception of which it comes described in art. 1.34.3 of the TCE.

Although this Treaty mentions principles of participant democracy ( art. 1,47) the citizens do not have capacity to take part in legislative proposals, since the described popular initiative does not have binding effects and single it talks about the application of the TCE. In other words that everything is in anything.

The final result of all the scaffolding is that the citizens are at the expense of laws that escape to their control and the control of their national political representatives. Only in the elections to the European Parliament the possibility is pronounced of taking part in the democratic life of the Union and we already see how!

• Relocation of the legislative power

We propose the correct of the legislative power "from top to bottom" as it appears within the framework institutional of the UE at the present time with the following points:

9. Increasing the legislative power of the European Parliament, representative organ of popular sovereignty popular, to all the European legislation. (House of Representatives). No directive or law of European scope of application could be ratified this camera behind the back of.

10. Proposing the creation of a Camera of territorial representation that collaborates closely with the European Parliament in the creation of laws; Camera in which is represented the States (through the its Parliaments) and other independent organizations, regional and local ones including in them. And euro-regions. Therefore we propose the suppression of the Committee of the Regions to understand that it is represented by this Camera.

11. Maintaining the Economic and Social Committee but with the name Social Committee, to understand that they fit in him from the associations of entrepreneurs (patronal ), of worker (trade unions) and other associations of the civil society.

12. Transforming into binding the European popular initiative. This initiative can be directed to the European Parliament or the Camera of the National Parliaments and can include any legislative proposal of interest for the Union, with the requirement of being representative of "we give" European (that is to say, reuniting sign of minimum number of citizens of different States from the UE)

13. Transforming the Council (of Ministers) into organ merely executive. Under the control of the European Parliament.

14. Transforming the European Commission into an organ of arbitrage and cohesion of the different policies from the Union. Their members and their President must elect by the European Parliament and respond individually before.

• Other requirements of institutional democratization:

15. Submission of the policies of the European Central Bank to the trusteeship of the Legislative chambers and the Council (specially the ECOFIN), in the only countries of the euro -zone. Re-defining the BCI objectives, appearing the full employment next to the stability of prices.

16. To facilitate the reinforced cooperations, without having to be in favor authorized of the European Council.

17. Democratization of the appointment of the judges of the Court of Justice.

18. Co-decision of the European Parliament in the matter of foreign policy and defense.

19. Finally we suggest to take as document bases for the discussion of the constitutional proposal, the project (decayed) of European constitution approved by resolution of 10 of February of 1994 by the European Parliament.

6. Strategies of performance to remove ahead our proposals

• the paper of the ATTACs in the resolution of the political and institutional crisis of the UE

ATTAC Spain understands that whereas the ATTAC are not political parties , the resolution of crisis does not enter within our assignment for which we are not responsible It is applicable as much in each country as in the set of Union structure . Another thing is that we were interested to assume certain commitments that facilitate the present crisis, whenever these commitments do not help to perpetuate the application of the neo-liberal policies

• the search of alliances

The search of alliances that support our proposals - alliances of political, institutional parties or base movements - would have to go preceded of a joint analysis of the present political situation in Europe to know clearly the favorable forces to rest the change that we propose.

It would positive that the ATTAC of European established a balance and an evaluation of the correlation of force in each country of the Union and as it has been the positioning and the policy of alliances of parties in relation to the Constitutional Treaty. As much the followed one in the campaigns of the respective referenda like the positions defended by the parties represented in the parliamentary arch of each country .

This proceeding will allow to delimit clearly that type of proposals that can be supported and to where we are going to go together in that way of alliances.

7. The difficulty to get at agreements between the different ATTAC and their application

Finally we are conscious of this difficulty. The different ideosyncrasy and the problematic of the 25 the countries of the Union can reflect contradictions that influence the different position of the ATTACs.

In this sense, it is necessary to make efforts to achieve a work system that help the consensus and does possible to arrive at a common vision of the citizens on the paper of the European Union. Also on the strategy to follow in the "short term".

In any case Attac- Spain wishes to emphasize in the necessity to approach the strategic aspects of this process of Convention of the Attac European so that the reached proposals can be assumed, or at least contemplated for its discussion and negotiation, as much in the national level as in the one of the European institutions.

For that reason besides to expose these concrete proposals to the pertinent organisms, we must insist on searching the support of other organizations and put the means to rest the proposals with mobilizations that reflect our capacity of convoking.

Paper coordinated by Ricardo Gómez Muñoz & Emili Brugalla October 2005 UE Commission Attac- Spain

ATTAC Finland

Document to be presented at the meeting of the European Attacs, Liège 23 october 2005

Attac Finland, as an organisation, never took a stand for or against the Constitutional Treaty. In fact, the board once decided not to have an opinion on the issue. This is mostly due to the Finnish political culture, which is not too open regarding the EU-issues.

However, we have tried to start a profound discussion on the subject this summer and autumn. The discussions we have had so far have showed the existence of a wide spectrum of opinions. On one particular point we are agreed, though: the goals of the global justice movement surpass by far any European goals in importance.

Many of us feel that the schedule of the ABC-plan is far too tight. This is mostly because of the fact that we did not have any extensive discussion on the treaty last spring (like many others did).

The variety of opinions in the Finnish discussion on the ABC-plan can be summarised as follows (each point representing a different aspect of the matter, not forcibly an entire stand):

1. In the European discussion, as well as in its general activities, Attac should focus on its original goals (tax havens, CTT, debt crisis etc.), because otherwise Attac will loose itself in endless discussions about Europe and the constitutional issues. This opinion is supported by most of the active members because they see Attac as a global movement that should concentrate on global structural issues (not just European issues). In practice, this would probably mean that the whole ABC-plan should be rewritten from a radically different position, meaning something like a world constitution.

2. Some of us think that forming an ABC-plan legitimizes the current and dominant vision of the EU. Therefore, Attac should neither be in favour of nor against the proposed Constitution, because Europe should not have a Constitution at all, or it's too early for a constitution with regards to the process of creating an understanding about European citizenship.

3. Attac Finland should do like Attac France and conduct a vote among its membership, to begin with. Many of us support this idea but we are not yet sure how to carry it out (our resources are limited and the situation is complex).

4. Attac should not have a detailed proposal but more like a general - and even utopian or at least more radical - vision of EU's future.

5. There should be no ABC-plan because EU is not on Attac's agenda, which was defined when Attac was founded.

6. Some of us feel that it is not sufficient to tackle a framework of competences, but that discussion on a social Europe should involve issues like the method of open coordination and the discussion should thus be expanded to involve broader detailed vision.

7. European constitutionalism as such is dead for the time being. We should thus focus on what ever will come out as the next treaty.

8. Attac has a role to play as a motor of public debate without taking a strict stand itself.

All together, probably only a minority of Attac Finland's members is ready to form his/her opinion by December. At least a common stand seems utopian in that timeframe. Many of us are worried about the possibility that concentrating on European issues paralyzes our current campaigns because there are not enough people to carry out the EU-issues besides the more global issues.

Whatever is decided upon the ABC plan the common hope of Attac Finland is that it would not compromise the diversity of national Attac chapters.

Helsinki 20 October 2005

Mikael Böök, Hanna Kuusela, Mikko Sauli and Mika Rönkkö for the board of Attac Finland.

Attac Germany

Another Constitution is Possible/Une autre Constitution est Possible

Requirements of a European Constitution by the EU Workshop of the Scientific Council of Attac Germany ( Elmar Altvater, Andreas Fisahn, Heide Gerstenberger, Jörg Huffschmid, Anne Karrass, Birgit Mahnkopf)

Demandes d’une Constitution Européenne par le Groupe de Travail sur l’UE du Conseil Scientifique d’Attac Allemagne (Elmar Altvater, Andreas Fisahn, Heide Gerstenberger, Jörg Huffschmid, Anne Karrass, Birgit Mahnkopf)

Purpose: The movements against the European Constitutional Draft show first visible successes. The French and Dutch “No” forced the governments of the Union to halt the ratification process and to order a pause for reflection. So that this pause for reflection be used not only for reflections on how to still realise the treaty as presented (the infamous Plan D etc.), we must think on alternatives to this draft. Such alternatives must, on the one hand, be in touch with the structures of the Union as they exist and in this way with the existing relationship of forces, in other words, it makes no sense to construct constitutional dream castles. On the other hand, they must bear witness to the changed relationships of forces successfully shifted as a result of the referendum and go beyond the present draft by way of clear alternatives and democratic improvements. To think means to overtake.

The EU work group of the scientific advisory board of attac in what follows presents such an alternative proposal, designed to stimulate the discussion among attacis and beyond (see also the proposal by Attac Belgium, Jean-Marie Coen et al., C.K.).

Objectif: Les mouvements contre le projet de Traité Constititionnel montrent leur premiers succès visible. Les « Non » français et hollandais ont forcés les gouvernements de l’Union d’arrêter le processus de ratification et d’ordonner une pause de réflexion ne soit utilisée uniquement pour inventer des ruses pour après tout réaliser le Traité présenté (par exemple, l’infâme Plan D), il faut réfléchir à des alternatives au présent projet. De telles alternatives doivent, d’un côté, être liés aux structures existantes de l’Union et ainsi aux rapports de forces existants, il n’y doivent donc pas être érigés des châteaux de rêves. Ils doivent, de l’autre côté, tenir compte du rapport de forces changé par les succès aux référendums et dépasser le présent projet par des améliorations et des alternatives claires et démocratique – penser veut dire dépasser (voire aussi la contribution d’attac Belgique, Jean-Marie Coen et al., n.d.l.t.).

Le groupe de travail du Conseil scientifique d’Attac Allemagne dans ce qui suit présente une telle proposition alternative, en Anglais pour commencer, destinée à animer la discussion parmi les Attacis et au-delà…

Standards for an alternative constitution

Alternative proposals for a constitution require evaluation standards or rational argumentation and justification. Here, there can not be taken into account all argumentation variants – in particular not all the state philosophical reflections. However, some criteria should be mentioned:

Basically, we should depart from the assumption that the European Union should be measured by the criteria and standards of constitutional law that are up to now applied to the national states. There exists an opinion widespread (especially among lawyers) that negates that the EU is a state, meaning that the requirements of constitutional law applied to a state then are no criterion for the EU. This cannot be discussed here in all detail: the state, however, as is well known, is not a determinate and clearly delineated material entity, but at best a collection of such entities to whom the name state is then ascribed. To put it briefly: the state is a social – mainly legal – construction which is covered by border lines: the frontier between inside and outside, between the public and the private or between existing or non-existing decision competence. These borderlines shift constantly and have also constantly shifted within the European nation states, ever since the foundation of the European Community, by transferring state functions to it. The accumulation of state functions- also undisputed in legal science – justifies it to consider the institution that has accumulated these functions a state. Moreover, the member states and the EU itself with the presentation of the Constitutional draft, or respectively with the choice of title “Constitution for Europe”, passed the borderline from the community of states, from an alliance of states to a state. Constitutions, in history, have typically been wrought from the states precisely in order to limit the power of the state. The objection that an erroneous name did not yet create a state, if its pre-conditions are non-existing, is not convincing.

Therefore, there must be applied to the constitution of this state – at least – the standards that were pushed through in social struggles against the old nation states. To these achievements, there belong among other things, the principles of the legal state including guaranteed individual basic rights, democracy and the social state, in Germany, moreover, also the duty to peace.

Constitutions have to be understood as social treaty, where there can be distinguished an individual and a rather more pluralistic-collective conception. Following the individual conception, the individual citizens conclude a contract on the basis of their life together. On the basis of this position, constitutions must be agreeable to all the individuals, since otherwise an agreement with the renunciation to force, implicit in the constitution, cannot be assumed. Individual capacity to agree in the modern understanding assumes that the constitution offers options to realise one’s/women’s individual interests, value concepts, preferences in society and, consequently, to be able to bring influence to bear on the society. This excludes the creation of structural minorities by the constitution by way of, for example, linking or decoupling privileges or rights to or from social status, religion, ethnicity or gender. Structural minorities can, for instance, also be generated by political stipulations of the constitutions that make it impossible to bring to bear individual interests, value concepts and preferences into the thus constituted society with the chance to realise tem. In this case, the constitution narrows the framework of political options downs so strongly, ties it so firmly with view to a particular ordering of values that for large parts of the society the constitutional draft is no longer agreeable. That was a central point of criticism against the Constitutional Treaty for Europe as proposed. It is not open towards the future in the sense that, on its basis, different political conceptions may find a majority and be realised. From there, there follows as criterion for requirements from a constitution that it must be individually agreeable to a large majority of society, which implies a far-reaching abstention as far as political determinations on future politics are concerned. In brief: The constitution must, from this perspective, determine the rules of game for politics, the framework for political confrontations, however, it may not take prior decisions on the essential policy fields themselves, meaning it must be open towards the future.

This conclusion becomes even clearer, if one understand the constitution as a social treaty in a pluralistic-collective sense. The constitution appears from this perspective as compromise line among pluralistic conflicts of interest, as class compromise or line of cease- fire in the social confrontations. This implies, first of all, that the parties to the compromise after all agree to the cease-fire, meaning to the use of force, and carry out their conflicts of interests or conflicts within the legal framework of the constitution. This means, secondly, however, that the constitution must keep open a room for such conflicts, a room, in which to pursue different ideas of society, different political conceptions, with the chance of implementing them politically. Again, this can be summarised as openness towards the future.

For the Basic Law, the compromise was seen mainly in that it was neutral as far as economic policy was concerned, as the Federal Constitutional Court has confirmed several times. A central point of criticism against the Constitutional Draft for Europe as presented is that it is not open towards the future, meaning that on this basis, it is hard if not excluded for different economic policy conceptions to find a majority and be realised. The draft presented bears the neoliberal stamp of the European Treaties and was, therefore, also not agreeable from a pluralistic point of view. The openness for political decisions on directions, from this point of view in particular, becomes openness to different economic policy conceptions including the possibility to socialise and democratically control important sectors of the economy.

On the basis of these criteria – state of law, democracy, social state, duty to peace and openness towards the future – one may formulate demands from an agreeable constitution of the European Union. In order to produce the link to the present draft of the treaty, this one – including the proposed institutions – is the basis of the normative requirements formulated here. In this context, it is being distinguished between minimal demands and more far-reaching demands.

Minimal demands

Minimal demands are:

• The elimination without replacement of the third part of the Constitutional Treaty, meaning renunciation to a clearly neoliberal orientation of the policy of the Union. The partly very detailed policy goals and prescriptions are being replaced by clear rules for competence and procedure that make possible various policies.

• The third part of the Constitution is a central subject of criticism. It contains a detailed determination of goals and in part means in various policy areas. Therefore, there is fixed in Art. III 177, 178 and 185, for instance, the commitment to the principle of the “open market economy with competition”, that means a clear obligation to neoliberalism in economic policy.

Goals and means of this people should, however, be open towards the future and object of the political competition, which should not be overly restricted by the competition, unless it wants to lose its character as constitution (compare note 1).

• The stipulation in the area of policy goals should, where this did not happen in Part One (Art. 13 ff.), be formulated as rules of competence that only name areas of competences, without making any substantial prescriptions to politics. If Part III is deleted that means that the unconditional regulations have to be integrated into Part II. To these regulations belongs the detailed description of the procedures, in particular of legislation and the attribution of individual competencies to a legislative procedure. To be concretised, therefore, are also the competencies and functions of the individual organs that find themselves in part loosely spread in the first and third part and (also due to that) are imprecise with the consequence that the organs may look for their competencies, or respectively the making concrete of competences is transferred to the European Court of Law. The constitution must contain clear and unambiguous regulations here.

• In the framework of competency rules, there should forcibly be foreseen an unambiguous framework competence in the area of the whole tax law and the entire social legislation. The unanimity rules for these areas should be lifted.

• The catalogue of competencies in Art. I 13 must be extended in an unrestricted fashion by tax policy. The latter up, to now, in the EC treaty, and in the constitutional draft (at least as far as the explicit regulation is concerned ), is restricted to the indirect taxes. At the same time, the principle of unanimity must be replaced that up to now had prevented an effective legislation. The competence for social policy needs to be extended, that means that the restrictions in the Third Part must be renounced to which take out certain parts of the policy from the regulatory competence and apply different voting modi and instead prescribe the procedure of “normal” co-decision. (compare note 2)

These are minimal demands, because they are the prerequisites for stopping the “race to the bottom” in both areas – that means to end the competition among the European national states for the “most favourable conditions of location” – meaning their complete degeneration into competitive states. At least, in the case of a competence to legislate in these areas, redistribution from the bottom to the top can no longer be justified by the reference to the more advantageous conditions of the neighbouring state, because it now becomes possible to set limits to social demolition by way of a European policy.

• Replacement of the Art I- 41 “Special Declarations on Common Security and Defence Policy” that obligates the member states “to gradually improve their military capabilities”, in other words, contains a comparatively clear order to rearm. This provision should be completely deleted and replaced by a clear defence of wars of aggression and the permission of military foreign interventions only if these are mandated by the UN Security Council.

• The defence of wars of aggression is enshrined in the Basic Law and part of the UN Charta, which is binding for the member state. Under dispute is, as is well known, whether foreign interventions are to be legitimated at all, whether in other words a UN mandate is adequate for foreign interventions. As long as foreign interventions, apparently in line with the written principles of the UN, are justified as humanitarian interventions or quasi emergency aid, it is a needed securing of the status quo to either bind the EU by unambiguous provisions of the constitution to the rules of the UN Charta, or to confirm these in the constitution. The point of reference must be the rules of the Charta, not their principles subject to debate, as it is written in the constitutional draft, which only opens the way out of admitting as “humanitarian interventions” more badly than well legitimated wars of aggression.

Further reaching demands

The mentioned minimal demands are not sufficient to elevate the EU constitution to the already achieved level of democratic participation and legal protection in the national states. In order to reach such a level, further fundamental changes in the constitution are necessary. The following remarks refer to such fundamental changes, not to very many small debates that it would also be justified to criticise:

Democratic participation

The institutions of the Union and the legislative procedure do not correspond – this is almost a common place – to the historically reached standard of democratic participation. If the member states, by way of a treaty, want to introduce a constitution and not only conclude a new multilateral treaty, this level is the standard.

The relationship between parliament and Council in the legislative process must be turned around. This means: normally, the parliament decides on the laws and this by a simple majority. The Council should only have a right of objection (reversed procedure of cooperation). In explicitly mentioned cases, an approval of the Council is required (reversed procedure of co-decision).

The central legislative organ of the Union, according to the EC treaty and the constitutional draft as presented is, as before, the Council and not the parliament. The European Community has long since left the state, where governmental agreements provide the political goals and can be transformed into legal acts. The governments of necessity always defend national particular interests, so that political agreements in the Council always constitute the character of a compromise among national particular interest. The concept of democratic representation, however, with different nuances, departs from the assumption that the bundling of different interests in the parliament and in a discourse between population and parliament offers a least the chance to formulate aspects of the general weal in policy and legislation. (compare note 3). This makes it necessary to shift, in a European constitution, the central legislative competence from the Council – as the representative of national particular interests – to the parliament – as the hypothetical representative of European general interests. The reversal of the existing procedures seems to be the proven method. In that context, it will of course be a matter of determining in detail what objects of politics require an approval by the Council – by which majority – and which ones do not, this cannot be discussed here, however.

Moreover, a democratic representation presupposes that there holds the principle of equality of votes. In other words, it holds: “one (wo)man, one vote”, each vote has the same weight. This is not the case in the parliament, at present, however, because if it were, the small states would be represented with very few of their own deputies. The regressively proportional representation contradicts the principle of equality of votes, however, given the current state of unity, it can, out of respect for the smaller states, not be changed. The Constitution must, therefore, be equipped with a re- examination rule, meaning the duty to change the representation, in about ten years, by way of simple majority, into the direction of equality of votes. Possibly, regional integration by then will have advanced sufficiently far, so that the representation according to national proportionality can step into the background. The different voting procedures in the Council may be maintained in a simplified form.

The European Parliament and the Council, just as the Commission, receive the right of initiative for legislation.

It is natural fact of democratic participation that the elected people’s representation can pass laws also against the will of the government or that the opposition can propose its own legislative initiatives in order to make deviating positions clear. Only that will make possible the production of a democratic, European public that also through the opposition controls the work of the majority and the executive and discusses its decisions. The exclusive competence of the executive, meaning the commission for legislative initiatives (Art I- 34) in a way provides the latter with a right of veto face to the elected legislator that cannot be justified.

The popular petition envisaged in the Constitution is extended by the popular referendum.

Most state constitutions by the European member states contain the possibility of popular legislation. Popular legislation consists as a rule of a popular petition that at first only founds an obligation to treat the topic and take a decision on it by the parliament. In the popular referendum, the people, by way of a vote, accept or reject a legislative draft or another form of draft resolution. A popular position without popular decision is an amputated form of popular legislation, undermining the sense of the latter, namely to be a corrective to the legislation by way of representative organs, where the latter distances itself from the majority opinions of the people. Democratic participation by way of popular legislation of necessity requires the possibility to replace parliamentary decisions by popular ones.

In this context, the popular referendum must be allowed to refer to all subjects that are the objects of parliamentary resolution, also for instance to laws that have an effect on the state budget.

Changes in the constitution can be traced to the initiative of the Council or of the parliament. They should be enacted by way of a popular referendum by the citizens of the Union. To the openness towards the future of the Constitution it belongs that it contains a mechanism for change and on the subject of its change does not refer to institutions outside of it: without mechanism for change, the constitution is a dictatorship of the present over the future generation. Changes to the constitution, in some constitutions, are possible by way of qualified majorities, where the precise number differs. Other constitutions hook up with the origins of the social contract and admit for constitutional treaties only by popular referendum. The union should pick up this democratic tradition.

The parliament chooses all commissioners (not only the president) and also can vote them out of office again individually. The Council should at most enjoy a veto.

This as well is a democratic reversal of the present relationships. The constitutional draft as submitted recognises explicitly in Art I-26 that the Commission functions as executive. Beyond all explicit competences, the executive has a central influence whether and in what form laws are implemented. Personal legitimation is, therefore, in all constitutions of the national states an important element of democratic participation.

The Commission at this point functions as extended arm of the national states, even it the number of the commissioners will be reduced and no longer all member states simultaneously supply one commissioner. It acts in a way decoupled from the parliament and as distantly as possible from the political will formation in the European population. This lack of participation is systemic. Democratic participation requires the responsibility of the executive face to the democratic sovereign and for the Union can only mean that all commissioners must be elected by parliament.

The principle of the state of law in the Union

The principle of the state of law includes not only the basic rights, but jurisprudence in the form of general laws and the control of the executive by the legal branch. The state of law finds itself among the objectives of the Union, it covers the whole law. Basic rights were newly included into Part II of the Treaty as submitted. The catalogue of basic rights in the constitutional treaty corresponds largely to the national treaty. It contains social basic rights reaching beyond the German Basic Law; in particular, the right to education (Art. II-74) should be mentioned. Some improvements should nevertheless be demanded:

• the Basic Rights including human rights are generally restricted in Art. II- 112, par. 2, ECT where this barrier is the principle of proportionality. Human dignity (Art. II-61) is to be granted unconditionally, however.

• Some basic rights are unconditionally mandated by the ECT (for instance, free opinion), others are not formulated as rights, but as the respect or recognition of existing structures – to the extent that they exist – by the EU. In their place, clear rights should be formulated.

• The reference to the explanations by the presidium of the Convent (Art. II-112, par. 7) has to be struck as superfluous. The First and Second World Wars, the Holocaust and other NAZI terror mandate a special German responsibility in this matter.

The Constitutional Treaty explicitly foresees an interdiction of torture in Art. II- 62. The discussion about loosening this interdiction, which is led in Germany and elsewhere, makes it clear how important is that also in this case human dignity is also granted unconditionally.

The clear formulation of rights itself is a requirement of the state of law, since otherwise it is left to the courts to interpret rights widely or narrowly and to usurp the power of the democratic legislator in this way.

It was criticised that, following Art. II-112, par. 7, the declarations drawn up by the Convent must be consulted in interpretation. One might say now that this rule only prescribes the usual, genetic interpretation, what in this sense would be unproblematic. By the explicit reference in the Constitution, however, the wish of the Convent presidium face to the general discussion of the Convent is highlighted in particular, and that is not to be justified. This point of methodology also has nothing to do in the constitution.

The right to a home has to be incorporated as an important social right.

The right to be working (Art. 75 II, par. 1) should be struck, together with entrepreneurial liberty (Art. 76 II) and be replaced by the right to work.

The guarantee of property has to be supplemented by the possibility to socialise ground and soil, natural resources and means of production.

Some constitutions of particular German federal regions (laender) contain a right to a dwelling and work and just as Art. 15 Basic Law they restrict the freedom of property by the explicit possibility to socialise the mentioned goods. These prescriptions have little practical relevance; they are, however, the basis for the determination that the Basic Law and the constitution of the laender are neutral from the economic policy point of view. They are, therefore, to be consulted for interpreting the prescriptions relevant from the economic policy point of view in the overall framework of the constitution. The fact that entrepreneurial liberty is enshrined into the constitution points into the opposite direction. If it is to have a meaning beyond the liberty of exercising a profession – also contained in the constitution - , then it means a border case of economic policy regulations. A constitution can be agreeable only if – in the central area of economic policy – it leaves room for manoeuvre for different political orientations. In order to produce this economic policy openness, the changes mentioned have to be implemented.

There has to be introduced a new basic right to one’s own genetic code, which protects to human gene code against consultation, publication and changes.

The Constitutional draft is more modern in this respect than the Basic Law and other European constitutions which could not yet be aware of the problem, when they were passed. Art. II-63, par. 2, Constitutional Draft contains the interdiction of eugenic practices and of selection, the interdiction to market the human body (in its parts) as well as the interdiction of reproductive cloning. In this way, a part of the foreseeable social consequences are regulated or put up for debate, but by far not all consequences that show themselves in the area of work life, insurances, general data protection and medical genetics, for instance in the form of therapeutic cloning. Therefore, there is needed a comprehensive protection of the human gene code by a particular basic rights which must be made legally concrete.

For the citizens, there must be created a more effective instrument to make valid the violation of their democratic basic rights by the legislation of the Union. To that end, there must be created an individual opportunity for appeal in case of violation of democratic rights of participation before the European Court of Law after unsuccessful exhaustion of the national instances.

The Parliament may complain about the violation of the Constitution by organs of the Union. That does not hold for parliamentary minorities or the opposition. Such a law of complaint of parliamentary minorities against the violation of democratic rules of procedure (not only due to violations of its own rights) should also be introduced.

The individual right to complaint before the European Court of the First Instance and before the European Court of Law - according to valid EC treaty and also following the constitutional draft - is involved, and its interpretation fills volumes. It should be noted, however, that individual rights of protection against Acts of Law of the Union, which do not concern the citizens individually, thus have to be individualised by an administrative act, are inadequate. Up to now, individuals may sue before the national courts and apply for a suit to the European Court of Law if they see European law as violated. However, the national laws do not have to follow suit to this request. Therefore, it seems reasonable in the interest of an individual legal protection to create a possibility for complaint because of the violation of rights of democratic participation rights after exhaustion of the legal avenues. There should not be demanded a general examination of conformity to the constitution or to all basic rights. The possibility for a suit should be restricted to interventions into rights of democratic participation that express themselves, at the individual level, for instance, in the free voicing of opinions, the right to join groups or assemble or in electoral law. In this way, the position of the individual in political will formation is strengthened, while it is avoided at the same time that the European Court of Law intervenes over the whole range of constitutional norms into the rights of the democratic legislators. For these reasons, the opposition should then also be given the possibility to complain about violations of competence and procedural rights before the Court of Law (compare note 4).

Social, economic, and environmental policy of the union

The social/welfare state is to be integrated, next to democracy and the state of law as basic value and final objective of the Union. For the realisation of the social state, there remains to the members state a public sector as autonomous organisation form of the economy under political control, which is exempt form the basic freedoms (meaning the rules of competition).

The social(welfare) state just as the state of law and democracy belongs to the central achievements that were imposed by way of social confrontations and compromises and, therefore, should be integrated on the same level as these as a basic value. Part I of the Constitutional Treaty contains references to social justice and social progress; however, it does not turn them into a basic principle of the state. One may object that the principle of the social/welfare state apart from the legal guarantee of a (modest) existential minimum is of little consequence for the legal system of the Federal Republic and is, therefore, expendable in a European constitution. The state guarantee of an existential minimum, however, is not necessarily part of the striving towards social justice as it is enshrined in the treaty. Moreover, the social state principle can be equipped with further derivatives and be interpreted in the sense of an integrated economic and social policy, which also makes it an additional corner pillar of the economic policy neutrality of the constitution.

The public sector as the central organiser of existential provision is an important instrument to implement principles of the social state also at the regional level. The Community in this area has, in the past, conducted a policy of liberalisation that for the women and men citizens only had very few positive effects, social (welfare) state achievements got lost. This makes it necessary to provide the public sector as part of the social state an independent guarantee of existence. For the concept of an integrated economic and social policy, the public sector can take over more far-reaching functions.

The budget of the Union is not decided by the Council, but by the parliament. The constitutional restriction of the expenditures to independent means, as it is foreseen in Art. I-53 f ECT, will be struck. Instead, the conduct of the budget is sworn in on a general economic equilibrium.

The budgetary law of the Parliament is one of its most important and oldest rights. The parliament in this way has at its disposal – at least in rough outlines – next to the control instrument of law also that of money which, as is well known, has a central role for the functioning of society.

The Constitutional Draft restricts the execution of the budget to the employment of its own resources. Also laws should, in accordance with Art. I- 53, par. 5 only be passed when the expenditures linked to them can be financed with the Union’s own means. The significance of this disposition is simple: The Union may not finance its expenditures by way of a credit. That is an economic policy stipulation that would prohibit it in the future to conduct, by way of an augmented budget, for instance, an anti-cyclical policy, for instance, in the sense of Keynes. The obligation to an economy-wide equilibrium by contrast requires taking up credits in order to drive forward European programmes to stimulate economic activity.

The European Central Bank, in particular its independence and unilateral obligation to price stability, should be struck without replacement from the constitution.

The Central Bank is mentioned not only in Part II of the Constitutional Treaty (which – as was said above, should be struck entirely), but also in Art I-30. Here, there are fixed as basis of operation of the ECB its independence and its obligation to price stability. The independence of a bank cannot be justified from the perspective of democratic participation. By way of monetary policy, the bank can exercise central influence on the development of the society and, in case of doubt, counteract the economic policy of a government. It can do all of this without democratic control and responsibility and without being coupled back to the will of a democratic sovereign. A Central Bank responsible before no one is not to be reconciled with a half-way functioning democracy.

Abolition of the EURATOM treaty As the only European treaty, the Euratom treaty that, since 1957, promotes the development of nuclear energy in Europe was not fused with the Constitutional Treaty. That is not sufficient, however; it must be eliminated and abolished. The promotion of atomic energy with its known risks and unresolved final disposal policy by way of means of research and credits cannot be condoned – even less its enshrinement into a treaty.

Notes for discussion

1) Politically, it seems unwise to attack the basic liberties that seem quasi like the foundation of the EU, directly. The basic liberties of the domestic market in principle find themselves also in Part 1 of the Constitution, they are sufficiently concretised by jurisdiction and European legal acts. Basic liberties and defences of subsidies are actually expendable in the constitution and can be regulated by simple legislative act. Then they could be more easily modified.

The basic liberties, in their present interpretation and secondary legal concretisation, are certainly part and parcel of the neoliberal project of the Union. That, however, is not binding: at the national state level, they were (apart from the interdiction of subsidies) always part of the ordinary trade laws, they are thus not forcibly connected to privatisation and deregulation.

2) It is under dispute whether a European legislation in the area of state and social policy would draw in its wake the danger of an equilibration towards the bottom. However, this does not prevent the integration of this competence into the treaty, because the contents of social policy could then be determined in the political process. Moreover, it seems at present that a competence for legislation at least opens the chance to draw a lower bound to the demolition by was minimal standards. Finally, there could – as in other policy areas – there can be permitted other, more far-reaching measures by the member states (for instance, higher protection level), or respectively, a need for their existence could be built into the treaty.

3) At this point, it is not reasonable to discuss the critique of this conception and the real deformities, since it is exclusively a matter of distributing legislative competences between Council and Parliament.

4) The examination of parliamentary decisions by a law is an ambiguous tool, since limits are set to the democratic legislators. It undoubtedly has a structural conservative effect and can be described as a means of securing power. The judicial examination of law was historically demanded for that purpose and finally implemented. In different historical periods, constitutional courts, however, have realised different functions. They also protect the political and social rights of the citizens. Thus one might argue against the above restriction on suability for democratic participation: if Council and Commission are being accorded a right to complain, this must also hold for the citizens, who may then at least sue for their rights themselves and not only the organs dominated by the executive. The same holds for a law to complaint by parliamentary minorities. A critical discussion is required in this context.

Resolution from the Nordic ATTAC

On the Nordic ATTAC meeting on October 28-30 2005, the issues of the French ABC-plan and the EU constitution were discussed. The Nordic ATTAC organisations are on very different levels, with regard to the debate on the EU constitution. Nevertheless, the seriousness and far-reaching consequences of the issue was recognised and therefore discussed thoroughly during the meeting. Besides agreement by all participants to further the debate in their home countries, the following statement was agreed on, to be presented at the ATTAC Europe meeting in Brussels, December 15:

The French and Dutch NO have led to a halt in the ratification of the constitutional treaty. This NO should be respected and therefore the 10 demands (the A of the ABC-plan) from ATTAC-France should be implemented in order to prevent parts of the refused constitution to be introduced incrementally.

Although we appreciate that ATTAC-France, as a consequence of their leading role in the French NO campaign, feels obliged, or wants to take advantage of the opportunity, to make proposals for a constitution, it is not obvious that doing so is really a matter for ATTAC. Regardless, to facilitate and contribute to the debate on democracy and how to curb the neo-liberal agenda is certainly a task for ATTAC.

ATTAC. Therefore, with regards to a constitution for the EU - if a constitution is the wish of the EU citizens - we are of the opinion that it should contain the following aspects:

Transparent democratic institutions, where elected members and not a commission has the legislative power.

Universal social rights, where respect for the individual is central.

Solidarity within and between the nations. International security policy without affiliation with specific organisations.

Otto Bruun ATTAC-Finland Mikael Böök ATTAC-Finland Sigrid Jacobsen ATTAC-Norway Hanna Kuusela ATTAC-Finland Anders Lund ATTAC-Denmark Marte Nilsen ATTAC-Norway Olli Ojala ATTAC-Finland Niklas Olin ATTAC-Sweden Mika Rönkkö ATTAC-Finland Mikko Sauli ATTAC-Finland Ville-Pekka Sorsa ATTAC-Finland Birgit Undein ATTAC-Norway Matti Ylönen ATTAC-Finland Kajsa Åkerström ATTAC-Sweden

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